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Selections from the Scottish philosophy of common sense Dugald Stewart James Beattie Thomas Reid 9781176972018 Books

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Selections from the Scottish philosophy of common sense Dugald Stewart James Beattie Thomas Reid 9781176972018 Books

The Introduction explains, “The Scottish philosophy of Common Sense originated as a protest against the philosophy of the greatest Scottish philosopher. Hume’s skeptical conclusions did not excite as much opposition as might have been expected. But in Scotland especially there was a good deal of spoken criticism which was never written; and some who would have liked to denounce Hume’s doctrines in print were restrained by the salutary reflection that if they were challenged to give reasons for their criticism they would find it uncommonly difficult to do so. Hume’s skepticism was disliked, but it was difficult to see how it could be adequately met. At this point [Thomas] Reid stepped into the field. He was the only man of his time who really understood the genius of Hume’s skepticism and succeeded in locating its sources.”

Reid exclaims, “Admired Philosophy! Daughter of light!... If thou are she, surely thou hast not yet arisen upon the human mind, nor blessed us with more of the rays than are sufficient to shed a darkness visible upon the human faculties, and to disturb that repose and security which happier mortals enjoy… But if, indeed, thou hast not the power to dispel these clouds and phantoms which those hast discovered or created, withdraw this penurious and malignant ray; I despise Philosophy, and renounce its guidance---let my soul dwell with Common Sense.” (Pg. 33-34)

Reid says, “I am conscious of a difference in kind between sensation and memory, and between both and imagination. I find this also, that the sensation compels my belief of the present existence of the smell, and memory of my belief of its past existence. There is a smell, is the immediate testimony of sense; there was a smell, is the immediate testimony of memory. If you ask me, why I believe that the small exists, I can give no other reason, nor shall eve be able to give any other, than that I smell it. If you ask, why I believe that it existed yesterday, I can give no other reason but that I remember it.” (Pg. 40-41)

He states, “it is no less a part of the human constitution, to believe the present existence of our sensations, and to believe the past existence of what we remember, than it is to believe that twice two makes four. The evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the necessary relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of evidence, equally grounded on our constitution: none of them depends upon, or can be resolved into another. To reason against any of these kinds of evidence is absurd; nay, to reason for them is absurd. They are first principles; and such fall not within the province of reason, but of common sense.” (Pg. 44-45) He continues, “If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and of which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them---these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd.” (Pg. 46)

He observes, “I believe there is not much more wisdom in many of those paradoxes of the ideal philosophy, which to plain sensible men appear to be palpable absurdities, but with the adepts pass for profound discoveries. I resolve, for my own part, always to pay a great regard to the dictates of common sense, and not to depart from them without absolute necessity: and therefore, I am apt to think that there is really something in the rose or lily, which is by the vulgar called smell, and which continues to exist when it is not smelled…” (Pg. 55)

He asks, “supposing we have got the conception of hardness, how came we by the belief of it? Is it self-evident, from comparing the ideas, that such a sensation could not be felt, unless such a quality of bodies existed? No. Can it be proved by probable or certain arguments? No; it cannot. Have we got this belief, then, by tradition, by education, or by experience? No; it is not got in any of these ways. Shall we then throw of this belief as having no foundation in reason? Alas! It is not in our power; it triumphs over reason, and laughs at all the arguments of a philosopher… I see nothing left, but to conclude, that, by an original principle of our constitution, a certain sensation of touch both suggests to the mind the conception of hardness, and creates the belief of it; or, in other words, that this sensation is a natural sign of hardness.” (Pg. 65-66)

He argues, “Sensation, and the perception of external objects by the senses, though very different in their nature, have commonly been considered as one and the same thing. The purposes of common life do not make it necessary to distinguish them, and the received opinions of philosophers tend rather to confound them; but, without attending carefully to this distinction, it is impossible to have any just conception of the operations of our senses. The most simple operations of the mind, admit not of a logical definition: all we can do is to describe them, so as to lead those who are conscious of them in themselves, to attend to them, and reflect upon them; and it is often very difficult to describe them so as to answer this intention.” (Pg. 77)

He asserts, “All reasoning is from principles. The first principles of mathematical reasoning are mathematical axioms and definitions; and the first principles of all our reasoning about existences, are our perceptions. The first principles of every kind of reasoning are given us by Nature, and are of equal authority with the faculty of reason itself, which is also the gift of Nature. The conclusions of reason are all built upon first principles, and can have no other foundation. Most justly, therefore, do such principles disdain to be tried by reason, and laugh at all the artillery of the logician, when it is directed against them.” (Pg. 81) He adds, “A train of events following one another ever so regularly, could never lead us to the notion of a cause, if we had not, from our constitution, a conviction of the necessity of a clause to every event.” (Pg. 91)

He goes on, “The operations of our minds are attended with consciousness; and this consciousness is the evidence, the only evidence, which we have or can have of their existence. If a man should take it into his head to think or to say that his consciousness may deceive him, and to require proof that it cannot, I know of no proof that can be given him; he must be left to himself, as a man that denies first principles, without which there can be no reasoning. Every man finds himself under a necessity of believing what consciousness testifies, and everything that hath this testimony is to be taken as a first principle… I know no proof that can be given him: he must be left to himself, either as a man that is lunatic, or as one who denies first principles, and is not to be reasoned with.” (Pg. 95, 97) Later, he adds, “we ask no argument for the existence of the object, but that we perceive it; perception commands our belief upon its own authority, and disdains to rest its authority upon any reasoning whatsoever.” (Pg. 102)

He acknowledges, “What the precise limits are which divide common judgment from what is beyond it on the one hand, and from what falls short of it on the other, may be difficult to determine, and men may agree in the meaning of the word who have different opinions about those limits, or who even never thought of fixing them. This is as intelligible as, that all Englishmen should mean the same thing by the county of York, though perhaps not a hundredth part of them can point out its precise limits.” (Pg. 122)

He summarizes by stating twelve “principles,” such as: “1. … I hold, as a first principle, the existence of everything of which I am conscious… 3. … That those things did really happen which I distinctly remember… 4. … Our own personal identity and continued existence… 5. … That those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be…. 6. … That we have some degree of power over our actions, and the determination of our will… 7. … That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious… 12. … in the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances.” (Pg. 126-129)

Adam Ferguson observes, “The life and activity of intelligent beings consists in the consciousness or perception of an improveable state, and in the effort to operate upon it for the better. This constitutes an unremitting principle of ambition in human nature. Men have different objects, and succeed unequally in the pursuit of them: but every person, in one sense or another, is earnest to better himself. Man is by nature an artist, endowed with ingenuity, discernment, and will. These faculties he is qualified to employ on different materials; but is chiefly concerned to employ them on himself: over this subject his power is more immediate and most complete; as he may know the law, according to which his progress is effected, by confirming himself to it, he may hasten or secure the result.” (Pg. 172-173)

James Beattie states, “Now, if that faculty by which we perceive truth in consequence of a proof, be called Reason, that power by which we perceive self-evident truth ought to be distinguished by a different name. It is of little consequence what name we make choice of, provided that in choosing it we depart not from the analogy of language; and that, in applying it, we avoid equivocation and ambiguity. Some philosophers of note have given the name of Common Sense to that faculty by which we perceive self-evident truth…” (Pg. 179)

He argues, “Now, if my common sense be mistaken, who shall ascertain and correct the mistake? Our reason, it is said. Are then the influences of reason in this instance clearer, and more decisive, than the dictates of common sense? By no means: I still trust to my common sense as before; and I feel that I must do so. But supposing the inferences of the one faculty as clear and decisive as the dictates of the other, yet who will assure me, that my reason is less liable to mistake than my common sense? And if reason be mistaken, what shall we say? Is this mistake to be rectified by a second reasoning, as liable to mistake as the first?” (Pg. 182-183)

Dugald Stewart suggests, “It appears to me…. more correct to call the belief of our own existence a concomitant or accessory of the exercise of consciousness, than to say, that our existence is a fact falling under the immediate cognizance of consciousness, like the existence of the various agreeable or painful sensations which external objects excite in our minds.” (Pg. 206)

He argues, “If we were to suppose an individual, whose conduct betrayed a disbelief of his own existence, or of his own identity, or of the reality of surrounding objects, it would by no means amount to an adequate description of his condition to say, that he was destitute of common sense. We should at once pronounce him to be destitute of reason, and would no longer consider him as a fit subject of discipline or of punishment. The former expression, indeed, would only imply that he was apt to fall into absurdities and improprieties in the common concerns of life.” (Pg. 214)

The “Common Sense” philosophers are certainly never going to supersede Hume in philosophy textbooks. But if you want to look into them further, you might read Reid’s Inquiry and Essays, Stewart’s Selected Philosophical Writings, or Beattie’s An Essay On The Nature And Immutability Of Truth: In Opposition To Sophistry And Skepticism.

Product details Paperback 282 pages Publisher Nabu Press (August 6, 2010) Language English ISBN-10 1176972014

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Selections from the Scottish philosophy of common sense Dugald Stewart James Beattie Thomas Reid 9781176972018 Books Reviews

Serves its purpose for research
This book is a republication of the original 1915 edition. The edition is well-formatted and has an active Table of Contents. I've not had any glitches in navigating to various parts of the book. For 0.99 cents, it was a good bargain.
The Introduction explains, “The Scottish philosophy of Common Sense originated as a protest against the philosophy of the greatest Scottish philosopher. Hume’s skeptical conclusions did not excite as much opposition as might have been expected. But in Scotland especially there was a good deal of spoken criticism which was never written; and some who would have liked to denounce Hume’s doctrines in print were restrained by the salutary reflection that if they were challenged to give reasons for their criticism they would find it uncommonly difficult to do so. Hume’s skepticism was disliked, but it was difficult to see how it could be adequately met. At this point [Thomas] Reid stepped into the field. He was the only man of his time who really understood the genius of Hume’s skepticism and succeeded in locating its sources.”

Reid exclaims, “Admired Philosophy! Daughter of light!... If thou are she, surely thou hast not yet arisen upon the human mind, nor blessed us with more of the rays than are sufficient to shed a darkness visible upon the human faculties, and to disturb that repose and security which happier mortals enjoy… But if, indeed, thou hast not the power to dispel these clouds and phantoms which those hast discovered or created, withdraw this penurious and malignant ray; I despise Philosophy, and renounce its guidance---let my soul dwell with Common Sense.” (Pg. 33-34)

Reid says, “I am conscious of a difference in kind between sensation and memory, and between both and imagination. I find this also, that the sensation compels my belief of the present existence of the smell, and memory of my belief of its past existence. There is a smell, is the immediate testimony of sense; there was a smell, is the immediate testimony of memory. If you ask me, why I believe that the small exists, I can give no other reason, nor shall eve be able to give any other, than that I smell it. If you ask, why I believe that it existed yesterday, I can give no other reason but that I remember it.” (Pg. 40-41)

He states, “it is no less a part of the human constitution, to believe the present existence of our sensations, and to believe the past existence of what we remember, than it is to believe that twice two makes four. The evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the necessary relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of evidence, equally grounded on our constitution none of them depends upon, or can be resolved into another. To reason against any of these kinds of evidence is absurd; nay, to reason for them is absurd. They are first principles; and such fall not within the province of reason, but of common sense.” (Pg. 44-45) He continues, “If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and of which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them---these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd.” (Pg. 46)

He observes, “I believe there is not much more wisdom in many of those paradoxes of the ideal philosophy, which to plain sensible men appear to be palpable absurdities, but with the adepts pass for profound discoveries. I resolve, for my own part, always to pay a great regard to the dictates of common sense, and not to depart from them without absolute necessity and therefore, I am apt to think that there is really something in the rose or lily, which is by the vulgar called smell, and which continues to exist when it is not smelled…” (Pg. 55)

He asks, “supposing we have got the conception of hardness, how came we by the belief of it? Is it self-evident, from comparing the ideas, that such a sensation could not be felt, unless such a quality of bodies existed? No. Can it be proved by probable or certain arguments? No; it cannot. Have we got this belief, then, by tradition, by education, or by experience? No; it is not got in any of these ways. Shall we then throw of this belief as having no foundation in reason? Alas! It is not in our power; it triumphs over reason, and laughs at all the arguments of a philosopher… I see nothing left, but to conclude, that, by an original principle of our constitution, a certain sensation of touch both suggests to the mind the conception of hardness, and creates the belief of it; or, in other words, that this sensation is a natural sign of hardness.” (Pg. 65-66)

He argues, “Sensation, and the perception of external objects by the senses, though very different in their nature, have commonly been considered as one and the same thing. The purposes of common life do not make it necessary to distinguish them, and the received opinions of philosophers tend rather to confound them; but, without attending carefully to this distinction, it is impossible to have any just conception of the operations of our senses. The most simple operations of the mind, admit not of a logical definition all we can do is to describe them, so as to lead those who are conscious of them in themselves, to attend to them, and reflect upon them; and it is often very difficult to describe them so as to answer this intention.” (Pg. 77)

He asserts, “All reasoning is from principles. The first principles of mathematical reasoning are mathematical axioms and definitions; and the first principles of all our reasoning about existences, are our perceptions. The first principles of every kind of reasoning are given us by Nature, and are of equal authority with the faculty of reason itself, which is also the gift of Nature. The conclusions of reason are all built upon first principles, and can have no other foundation. Most justly, therefore, do such principles disdain to be tried by reason, and laugh at all the artillery of the logician, when it is directed against them.” (Pg. 81) He adds, “A train of events following one another ever so regularly, could never lead us to the notion of a cause, if we had not, from our constitution, a conviction of the necessity of a clause to every event.” (Pg. 91)

He goes on, “The operations of our minds are attended with consciousness; and this consciousness is the evidence, the only evidence, which we have or can have of their existence. If a man should take it into his head to think or to say that his consciousness may deceive him, and to require proof that it cannot, I know of no proof that can be given him; he must be left to himself, as a man that denies first principles, without which there can be no reasoning. Every man finds himself under a necessity of believing what consciousness testifies, and everything that hath this testimony is to be taken as a first principle… I know no proof that can be given him he must be left to himself, either as a man that is lunatic, or as one who denies first principles, and is not to be reasoned with.” (Pg. 95, 97) Later, he adds, “we ask no argument for the existence of the object, but that we perceive it; perception commands our belief upon its own authority, and disdains to rest its authority upon any reasoning whatsoever.” (Pg. 102)

He acknowledges, “What the precise limits are which divide common judgment from what is beyond it on the one hand, and from what falls short of it on the other, may be difficult to determine, and men may agree in the meaning of the word who have different opinions about those limits, or who even never thought of fixing them. This is as intelligible as, that all Englishmen should mean the same thing by the county of York, though perhaps not a hundredth part of them can point out its precise limits.” (Pg. 122)

He summarizes by stating twelve “principles,” such as “1. … I hold, as a first principle, the existence of everything of which I am conscious… 3. … That those things did really happen which I distinctly remember… 4. … Our own personal identity and continued existence… 5. … That those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be…. 6. … That we have some degree of power over our actions, and the determination of our will… 7. … That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious… 12. … in the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances.” (Pg. 126-129)

Adam Ferguson observes, “The life and activity of intelligent beings consists in the consciousness or perception of an improveable state, and in the effort to operate upon it for the better. This constitutes an unremitting principle of ambition in human nature. Men have different objects, and succeed unequally in the pursuit of them but every person, in one sense or another, is earnest to better himself. Man is by nature an artist, endowed with ingenuity, discernment, and will. These faculties he is qualified to employ on different materials; but is chiefly concerned to employ them on himself over this subject his power is more immediate and most complete; as he may know the law, according to which his progress is effected, by confirming himself to it, he may hasten or secure the result.” (Pg. 172-173)

James Beattie states, “Now, if that faculty by which we perceive truth in consequence of a proof, be called Reason, that power by which we perceive self-evident truth ought to be distinguished by a different name. It is of little consequence what name we make choice of, provided that in choosing it we depart not from the analogy of language; and that, in applying it, we avoid equivocation and ambiguity. Some philosophers of note have given the name of Common Sense to that faculty by which we perceive self-evident truth…” (Pg. 179)

He argues, “Now, if my common sense be mistaken, who shall ascertain and correct the mistake? Our reason, it is said. Are then the influences of reason in this instance clearer, and more decisive, than the dictates of common sense? By no means I still trust to my common sense as before; and I feel that I must do so. But supposing the inferences of the one faculty as clear and decisive as the dictates of the other, yet who will assure me, that my reason is less liable to mistake than my common sense? And if reason be mistaken, what shall we say? Is this mistake to be rectified by a second reasoning, as liable to mistake as the first?” (Pg. 182-183)

Dugald Stewart suggests, “It appears to me…. more correct to call the belief of our own existence a concomitant or accessory of the exercise of consciousness, than to say, that our existence is a fact falling under the immediate cognizance of consciousness, like the existence of the various agreeable or painful sensations which external objects excite in our minds.” (Pg. 206)

He argues, “If we were to suppose an individual, whose conduct betrayed a disbelief of his own existence, or of his own identity, or of the reality of surrounding objects, it would by no means amount to an adequate description of his condition to say, that he was destitute of common sense. We should at once pronounce him to be destitute of reason, and would no longer consider him as a fit subject of discipline or of punishment. The former expression, indeed, would only imply that he was apt to fall into absurdities and improprieties in the common concerns of life.” (Pg. 214)

The “Common Sense” philosophers are certainly never going to supersede Hume in philosophy textbooks. But if you want to look into them further, you might read Reid’s Inquiry and Essays, Stewart’s Selected Philosophical Writings, or Beattie’s An Essay On The Nature And Immutability Of Truth In Opposition To Sophistry And Skepticism.